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Abstract
In this paper, I shed some light on a much discussed topic in the policy debate: Should national
macroprudential policies be supervised by a supranational entity in a monetary union? To do so,
I develop a two-country DSGE monetary union model, which I calibrate to the core and periphery
regions of the euro area. Monetary policy is set by the ECB, while macroprudential policies, based on
the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), are set nationally. Results show that, given that the economy in the
periphery is more leveraged, macroprudential policies need to be more aggressive in that region. I also
nd that, when LTV policies are set independently in a non-coordinated manner by each authority,
albeit being benecial for both countries and for the union as a whole, welfare gains are not as high
as when they are coordinated and supervised by a separate body.
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1 Introduction
The severe crisis we have experienced in the last decade has taught us that we need policies now to
prevent systemic risk and excessive credit growth, namely macroprudential policies. In the euro area,
the institutional framework comprises various authorities with a macroprudential mandate at a national
level, and the ECB with specic macroprudential competence at the Banking Union level. The ECB
monitors developments in the banking sector of the euro area and the EU as a whole, as well as other
nancial sectors, to identify any vulnerabilities and check the resilience of the nancial system. It carries
out these tasks together with the other central banks of the Eurosystem and the European System of
Central Banks. That is, macroprudential policies are implemented at a national level, but within a
system of central supervision.
However, this current macroprudential framework still generates a number of doubts because of the
complex process for coordinating measures across heterogeneous members. The euro area is indeed an
area in which member statesbusiness and nancial cycles are not fully synchronized, especially as regards
credit and housing markets. Following this debate, the European Commission launched in 2016 a consul-
tation on the EUmacroprudential framework to gather feedback and evidence on how it is functioning and
how should be properly be designed. The key aim was to ensure the right balance between national exi-
bility and central supervision is achieved (See http://ec.europa.eu/nance/consultations/2016/macroprudential-
framework/index_en.htm).
In this paper, I explore this issue from a theoretical perspective, with a two-country monetary union
DSGE model calibrated for core and periphery. In particular, I study the welfare implications of having
national macroprudential policies supervised by a centralized entity that is in charge of safeguarding the
welfare of the whole union. In this way, I can propose what the optimal compromise between national
and centralized policies would be. For that purpose, I consider two cases; one in which policies are set
by each country independently, in a non-coordinated manner; and one in which there is a supranational
authority that coordinates the policies and acts in favor of the whole union.
Results show that macroprudential policy should be more aggressive in the periphery, given its more
leveraged economy, supporting the use of national macroprudential policies. However, welfare increases
by more if policies are supervised and coordinated by a supranational authority, which acts in favor of
having the ECB as a coordinating entity.
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2 Model Setup
The model constitutes a two-country monetary union version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005),
introducing cross-country housing-market heterogeneity in the spirit of Rubio (2014). The home country
represents the core economy and the rest of the union is the periphery. Variables in the periphery are
denote by a star. Households consume, work, and demand real estate. Each country produces one
di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods from both countries. There are two
types of consumers in each country: borrowers and savers. Borrowers are constrained individuals who
need to collateralize their debt repayment with housing. Firms follow a standard Calvo problem. There
is a construction sector that produces houses. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank
that responds to a weighted average of ination in both countries. A separate authority conducts
macroprudential policy. I allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
I summarize the consumers problem below. Here, only the problems and the equations for the core
economy are presented and discussed, since the model is symmetric. The complete set of structural
equations is presented in the Appendix.
2.1 The Consumers Problem
2.1.1 Savers
Savers in the core economy maximize as follows:
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1X
t=0
t

ln eCt + j lnHt   (Lut )


; (1)
E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and eCt, Ht, and Lt are consumption at
t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively. j represents the weight of housing in the utility
function. 1= (   1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: eCt = (Ct)n (Ct )1 n ;
where n is the size of the core economy. Savers provide labor to both the consumption and construction
sector, so that Lt =
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The budget constraint is as follows:
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where Pt and P t are the prices of the goods produced in the home country and abroad, respectively, Qt
is the housing price, and Wct and Wht are the consumption and housing sector wages for unconstrained
consumers. Bt represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. Rt is the nominal
interest rate in the home economy. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify
savings. However, as we will see, unconstrained consumers will choose not to borrow at all: they are
the savers in this economy. Dt are foreign-bond holdings by savers at home.1 Rt is the nominal rate of
foreign bonds, which are denominated in euros. As is common in the literature, to ensure stationarity of
net foreign assets we introduced a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t .
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Savers obtain interest on their savings. Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms. Tt are lump-sum
government transfers.
Dividing by Pt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods at home. Maximizing (1)
subject to the budget constraint, we obtain the rst-order conditions for the savers.
2.1.2 Borrowers
Borrowers are more impatient than savers, that is e < . They face a collateral constraint: the expected
debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation of tomorrows value
of todays stock of housing:
Et
Rt
t+1
b
0
t  ktEtqt+1H
0
t ; (3)
kt can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio and it is the instrument for the national macropru-
dential regulator.
Borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
1Savers have access to international nancial markets.
2See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) for a similar specication of the budget constraint.
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and subject to the collateral constraint (3).
2.2 Macroprudential Policy
As an approximation for a realistic macroprudential policy, I consider a Taylor-type rule for the loan-to-
value ratio (LTV), which responds to credit deviations from its steady state.3 Macroprudential policy is
national, that is, each country can implement its own rule:
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2.3 Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to reect the core economy and the periphery. Some of the parameters are
standard and are common for both economies and some others will be specically calibrated for each
area.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the
literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in
steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.4 The steady-state weight of housing
in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to
GDP.5 I set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1:6 Following Horvath (2000) and
3 I call it "Taylor type" because its structure reminds that of the traditional Taylor rule for monetary policy.
4Lawrance (1991) estimate discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
5Following Aspachs and Rabanal (2010), I use 1.40, value that reects the ratio of housing wealth to GDP across most
industrialized countries as a proxy for the euro area.
6Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
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Iacoviello and Neri (2010), I set the inverse elasticity of substitution across hours in the two sectors
to 1: For the loan-to-value ratio I consider a steady-state value of 0.70 and 0.80, for the core and the
periphery, respectively, in order to reect a low and a high leveraged country.7 The labor-income share
of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7.8 I pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution
among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not
changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For the
Taylor rule parameters, I use  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree of interest-rate
smoothing.9  is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993: The size of the
peripheral group is considered to be 40%.10 A technology shock is a 1% positive technology with 0:9
persistence.11
3 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
For the optimal macroprudential policy calculation, I study two polar cases; the rst one corresponds to
two independent national policies, which are not coordinated and which do not take into account union
welfare, just national welfare; the second one considers a coordinated case in which a supranational
authority decides the national policy, favoring the whole union. Monetary policy is taken as given in all
cases.12
When national policies are designed independently and without taking into account the union welfare,
I consider a non-coordinated game between the two countries in which the Nash equilibrium would
determine the solution. However, when they are supervised by the ECB, national authorities are forced
to simultaneously take into account union welfare when optimizing their policies.
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimate could have a downward bias of 50%.
7These values approximately reect the prevalent loan-to-values in Germany and Spain, representing respectively the
core and the periphery. Their residential debt-to-income ratio also reects the di¤erent level of leverage in these countries,
42.4 and 55.4 in 2014, respectively (CESifo).
8This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Therefore, I take it as valid for most of the countries of the
euro area.
9See McCallum (2001).
10 I follow Quint and Rabanal (2014).
11This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2003) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
for the US.
12 I solve the model using a second-order approximation of the structural equations, for given policy and for common
technology shocks, and then evaluate welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I take this latter
approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately and then I aggregate across agents and
countries.
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Table 1: Optimal Macroprudential Policy
National Policies Independent Supervised
b b y  b b y  Welf Gain
CORE 0.4 1.315 1.931 0.263 0.6 1.052 1.929 0.265 0.0045
PERIPHERY 0.5 1.249 1.920 0.262 0.7 1.008 1.918 0.263 0.0032
UNION - 1.288 1.926 0.263 - 1.034 1.924 0.264 0.0040
Table 1 presents results from the optimization problem, considering the two cases mentioned above;
independent versus supervised national macroprudential policies. I display the optimized parameters in
the macroprudential rules for both cases and the volatilities of macroeconomic and nancial variables,
measured by the standard deviation of borrowing, output and ination. I also calculate the welfare gain
derived from having a supervised macroprudential policy as opposed to a non coordinated one.13
Results show that macroprudential policies need to be more aggressive in the periphery. This is a
consequence of a more leveraged economy in this region that makes it more volatile under technology
shocks. However, when national policies are coordinated and supervised by a supranational authority,
which ensures that union welfare is maximized, macroprudential policies in both countries need to
respond more strongly to nancial developments. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the periphery has
a higher coe¢ cient in the macroprudential rule. We can see that having a supervised macroprudential
policy is Pareto improving, according to the last column in Table 1. We observe that, with respect to
the independent situation, both countries and the whole union have a welfare improvement. In terms
of volatilities, nancial markets are more stable in the supervised case, contributing to the welfare gain.
In terms of macroeconomic volatilities, output is more stable in the supervised case, at the expense of
a slightly higher ination volatility. A stronger macroprudential policy seems to interfere with the ECB
monetary policy and this is why it is less e¤ective in stabilizing ination.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I build a two-country, two-sector DSGE model with housing and collateral constraints
in order to illustrate how national macroprudential policies should be set in the euro area. I consider
two countries within a monetary union; core and periphery. These two countries di¤er in their housing
markets. In terms of national macroprudential policies, I consider that the LTV can be set at a national
13Welfare gains are presented in consumption equivalent units.
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level. However, I study two cases, one in which national macroprudential policies are set independently,
in a non-coordinated game, and one in which there is a supranational authority supervising the setting
of these policies.
Results show that the LTV rule needs to be more aggressive in the periphery, both in the independent
and supervised case. However, coordinating policies calls for a stronger response of the LTV in both
regions, and it delivers an unambiguous welfare improvement with respect to independently setting them.
The welfare gain is coming from more stable nancial markets and less volatile output, however, it comes
at the expense of a slightly higher ination volatility, because macroprudential policies interfere with the
ECB monetary policy.
Appendix
Here, I present the equations describing the core economy. Similar equations hold for the periphery
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Monetary Policy
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where Yt, It and t represent output, housing investment and ination, respectively. t is the
Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint. Xt is the markup. At and "R;t are technology and
monetary policy shocks, respectively.
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Table A1: Parameter Values
 0:99 Discount Factor for Saverse 0:98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j 0:12 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k 0:7=0:8 Loan-to-value, core/periphery
 0:70 Labor-Income share for savers
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
1   2 Labor elasticity of substitution across sectors
n 0:6 Core country Size
R 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 0:5 Ination Parameter in Taylor rule
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